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ABSTRACT
The increasing popularity of specialized Internet-connected
devices and appliances, dubbed the Internet-of-Things (IoT),
promises both new conveniences and new privacy concerns.
Unlike traditional web browsers, many IoT devices have al-
ways-on sensors that constantly monitor fine-grained details
of users’ physical environments and influence the devices’
network communications. Passive network observers, such
as Internet service providers, could potentially analyze IoT
network traffic to infer sensitive details about users. Here,
we examine four IoT smart home devices (a Sense sleep
monitor, a Nest Cam Indoor security camera, a WeMo switch,
and an Amazon Echo) and find that their network traffic rates
can reveal potentially sensitive user interactions even when
the traffic is encrypted. These results indicate that a techno-
logical solution is needed to protect IoT device owner pri-
vacy, and that IoT-specific concerns must be considered in
the ongoing policy debate around ISP data collection and
usage.
1. INTRODUCTION
The rapidly expanding availability and diversity of
Internet of Things (IoT) devices for consumer smart
homes promises to revolutionize how we interact with
our living spaces. However, smart homes containing
many Internet-connected devices raise substantial pri-
vacy concerns.
The contents, patterns, and metadata of network traf-
fic can all reveal sensitive information about a user’s on-
line activity. In the past, online activity was primarily
limited to web browsing. Unlike web browsers, smart
home devices’ always-on sensors transmit information
about a user’s offline activities on the Internet. This
detailed data could be valuable in many contexts, in-
cluding advertising and business intelligence.
We define a “smart home device” as any single-purpose
Internet-connected device intended for home use (e.g.
a thermostat, outlet, or blood-pressure monitor) or a
hub-like device that connects and controls multiple single-
purpose devices (e.g. a Samsung SmartThings hub or
Amazon Echo). Interacting with a smart home device
– or even simply living within the range of a smart home
device’s environmental sensors – changes how the device
communicates with remote servers. It would be a pri-
vacy concern if a passive network observer, such as an
Internet service provider (ISP), were able to infer user
behavior from these changes in Internet traffic.
Concerns over the abilities of network observers have
led regulators to institute new rules on ISP data col-
lection and usage [4, 5]. Some opponents argue that
stronger regulation is unnecessary, because the increas-
ing pervasiveness of encryption prevents ISPs from ob-
serving sensitive data in traffic content [9]. Privacy ad-
vocates, however, argue that metadata and traffic pat-
terns can reveal sensitive information even when traffic
content is unavailable [3]. Further research detailing
privacy vulnerabilities of encrypted traffic and meta-
data from IoT devices can help inform future regulation
as IoT devices become more prevalent.
In this paper, we develop a strategy that a passive
network observer could use to infer consumer behavior
from rates of IoT device traffic, even when the traffic is
encrypted. This strategy relies on the limited-purpose
nature of IoT devices to map traffic patterns to device
states. We set up a smart home laboratory with a pas-
sive network tap to model how a real-life observer could
collect traffic from an actual smart home.
We examine four commercially available smart home
devices: a Sense sleep monitor [8], a Nest Cam Indoor
security camera [7], a Belkin WeMo switch [10], and
an Amazon Echo [1]. Using traffic from the Sense, a
network observer could infer a user’s sleeping patterns.
Using traffic from the Nest Cam, an observer can infer
when a user is actively monitoring the camera feed or
when the camera detects motion in its field of vision.
Using traffic from the WeMo switch, an observer can
detect when a physical appliance in a smart home is
turned on or off. Using traffic from the Echo, an ob-
server can detect when a user is interacting with an
intelligent personal assistant.
In light of these results, we are working to develop
solutions that allow users to protect themselves from
smart home privacy vulnerabilities. While additional
research is necessary, the case studies we have performed
1
ar
X
iv
:1
70
5.
06
80
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  1
8 M
ay
 20
17
motivate components of a general solution. Traffic shap-
ing will be required to mask the true rate of devices’
network traffic. VPN tunneling or another method of
obfuscating packet headers would make it more difficult
to identify individual devices. The challenge will be
in combining multiple defensive strategies into a user-
friendly and easily-deployable solution for smart homes.
2. THREAT MODEL
Our privacy analysis assumes a passive network threat
model with capabilities similar to an ISP. Specifically,
an adversary in this model can observe and record all
wide-area network traffic, including traffic to and from
home gateway routers. The adversary cannot view local-
area network traffic between devices behind a gateway
router. The adversary also cannot manipulate network
traffic. We assume that ISPs are typically uninter-
ested in performing targeted active attacks on individ-
ual users.
In this paper, we do not use packet contents. In fact,
we note that all 4 tested IoT devices use TLS/SSL when
communicating with 1st and 3rd party cloud servers.
Our analysis relies entirely on metadata. IP packet
headers, TCP packet headers, and send/receive rates
are all available to the adversary. This sort of metadata
is regularly collected by major ISPs for traffic analysis.
Finally, we assume that the adversary can obtain
and analyze IoT devices. For instance, using their own
smart home laboratory, an adversary can collect traffic
data to help identify devices in live consumer traffic.
While we are only focused on the passive network
threat model, other threat models (e.g. compromised
home devices or Wi-fi eavesdroppers) could provide in-
teresting opportunities for future study.
3. LABORATORY SMART HOME
We have set up a laboratory smart home environment
to examine the network behavior of several on-market
IoT devices.
We included the following popular IoT devices in
our laboratory smart home, covering a range of device
types, manufacturers, and privacy concerns: 1) Sense
sleep monitor 2) Nest Cam Indoor security camera 3)
WeMo switch (smart power outlet) 4) Amazon Echo
We configured a Raspberry Pi 3 Model B as a 802.11n
wireless access point for use as the laboratory smart
home’s gateway router. The Raspberry Pi 3 has a
built-in WiFi antenna, so no additional hardware was
needed. The Raspberry Pi ran the Raspbian Jessie OS,
a version of Debian Linux optimized for the Raspberry
Pi platform. Hostapd (host access point daemon) en-
abled mac80211-compliant access point and authentica-
tion server services. Dnsmasq enabled DNS and DHCP
services. An iptables NAT connected the Raspberry
Pi’s wireless interface to the wired interface connected
by Ethernet to the WAN.
This setup allowed us to record all packets to and
from IoT devices connected to the Raspberry Pi. We
recorded traffic from all devices operating concurrently
and performed several controlled experiments with indi-
vidual devices. The resulting packet capture files were
the raw data used for analysis in Sections 4 & 5.
4. IoT TRAFFIC ANALYSIS STRATEGY
In this section we present a three step strategy that
a passive network observer could use to identify devices
in a smart home and infer user behavior.
4.1 Separate traffic into packet streams
An adversary must first divide recorded network traf-
fic into meaningful streams that can be used for fur-
ther analysis. In most standard consumer use cases, the
home gateway router acts as a network address trans-
lator (NAT), rewriting local IP addresses of individual
devices to a single public IP address given to the router
by the ISP. This prevents an adversary from using IP
addresses to divide traffic into per-device packet sets.
Identifying and counting distinct clients behind a NAT
is a known problem [2, 6]. However, it is always possi-
ble to separate network traffic into streams by the ex-
ternal IP address of the server communicating with the
devices (“service IP”) and, in cases where multiple de-
vices use the same service IP, the TCP port rewritten
by the NAT. While the devices we studied often com-
municate with multiple service IPs, we discovered that
the adversary typically only needs to identify a single
stream that encodes the device state.
4.2 Label streams by type of device
Once individual streams have been separated, the ad-
versary next identifies what IoT device most likely is
responsible for each stream. Knowing what devices a
consumer owns can be a serious privacy violation by it-
self. For example, a consumer might not want an ISP
knowing they own an IoT blood sugar monitor or pace-
maker.
In our case studies, the DNS queries associated with
each stream could be mapped to a particular device
(Figure 1). For example, the Nest Cam queried do-
mains from dropcam.com (the predecessor to the Nest
Cam), while the Sense sleep monitor queried domains
from hello.is (the company that makes the Sense). An
adversary could use a laboratory setup like our own to
learn these mappings or perform reverse DNS lookups to
pair service IPs with device-identifying domain names.
However, multiple devices from the same manufac-
turer might communicate with the same service IPs,
making device identification using DNS more difficult.
For example, the Belkin WeMo switch queried domains
that could have been used by any type of Belkin de-
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Device DNS Queries
Sense Sleep Monitor hello-audio.s3.amazonaws.com
hello-firmware.s3.amazonaws.com
messeji.hello.is
ntp.hello.is
sense-in.hello.is
time.hello.is
Nest Security Camera nexus.dropcam.com
oculus519-vir.dropcam.com
pool.ntp.org
WeMo Switch prod1-fs-xbcs-net-1101221371.
us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com
prod1-api-xbcs-net-889336557.
us-east-1.elb.amazonaws.com
Amazon Echo ash2-accesspoint-a92.ap.spotify.com
audio-ec.spotify.com
device-metrics-us.amazon.com
ntp.amazon.com
pindorama.amazon.com
softwareupdates.amazon.com
Figure 1: DNS queries made by tested IoT de-
vices during a representative packet capture.
Many queries can be easily mapped to a specific
device or manufacturer.
vice. Measuring the extent of this problem and finding
solutions will be the subject of future study.
4.3 Examine traffic rates
Once an adversary identifies packet streams for a par-
ticular device, one or more of the streams are likely to
encode device state. Simply plotting send/receive rates
of the streams (bytes per second) revealed potentially
private user interactions for each device we tested.
An adversary with a laboratory smart home of their
own can easily correlate variations in traffic rates with
known user interactions. They can then map similar
variations from live traffic to user behavior.
Even without a laboratory smart home, an adversary
can still infer user interactions from traffic variations
if they have identified the device and know its limited
purpose. For example, the Sense sleep monitor was both
easily identified from DNS queries, and has a limited
purpose. A traffic spike from the monitor in the late
evening, for instance, likely corresponds to when the
user went to sleep.
5. DEVICE CASE STUDIES
For all tested IoT devices, send/receive rates were suf-
ficient for identifying user behaviors and interactions.
Though all of the devices encrypted their traffic, en-
cryption alone did not prevent privacy vulnerabilities.
5.1 Sense sleep monitor
Traffic to and from the Sense sleep monitor was easy
to identify from DNS queries because all of the domains
contain “sense” or “hello.” Figure 2A shows send/receive
rates from the Sense over an approximately 12 hour pe-
riod from 10:40pm to 10:40am. Notably, the send/receive
rate peaked at times corresponding with user activity.
The user shut off the light in the laboratory smart home
and went to bed at 12:30am, temporarily got out of bed
at 6:30am, and got out of bed in the morning at 9:15am.
The traffic peaks correlated with these activities were
not coincidental to this recording. Additional overnight
traffic recordings also contained easily noticeable peaks
when the user got into and out of bed.
We believe that the ability of an network observer
to tell when a user is sleeping, or at least in bed, from
network send/receive rates constitutes a significant pri-
vacy vulnerability. ISPs can already guess when users
are sleeping when network traffic from smartphones or
PC web browsers decreases at night; however, this re-
lies on many assumptions, e.g. that users only stop us-
ing their other devices immediately prior to sleeping,
that everyone in the home sleeps at the same time and
does not share other devices, and that users do not
leave their other devices running to perform network-
intensive tasks or updates while they sleep. The single-
purpose IoT nature of the Sense sleep monitor makes
none of these assumptions necessary to infer users’ sleep-
ing patterns from Sense traffic.
5.2 Nest Cam Indoor security camera
Our observations of the Nest camera indicate that
it has at least two primary modes of operation: a live
streaming mode and a motion detection mode. In the
live streaming mode, the camera’s video feed is either
being actively viewed by the user through the Nest
web/mobile application or the feed is being uploaded
in real time to be stored on the cloud (for users with
paid accounts). In the motion detection mode, the video
stream is not being uploaded, but the camera is mon-
itoring the stream locally for movement. If movement
is observed, the camera records a snapshot of the video
and alerts the user.
Nearly all TCP traffic to and from the Nest camera is
with dropcam.com domains, making it easy to identify
from DNS queries. Figure 2B shows send/receive rates
from the Nest camera alternating between live stream-
ing and motion detection mode every 2 minutes. The
traffic rate is orders of magnitude higher in live stream-
ing mode (and a short time afterward until the camera is
notified that the user has stopped viewing the stream),
allowing an adversary to easily determine whether or
not the camera’s live feed is being actively viewed or
recorded.
Figure 2C shows that an adversary could also easily
determine when a Nest camera detects movement when
it is in motion detection mode. The camera was pointed
at a white screen with a black square that changed loca-
tion every two minutes. These simulated motion events
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triggered clearly observable spikes in network traffic.
This predictable variability in network send/receive rates
would allow an adversary to observe the presence and
frequency of motion inside a smart home.
These issues are significant privacy vulnerabilities and
physical security risks even though the content of the
video stream remains protected by encryption. It should
not be possible for a third party to be able to determine
when a security camera detects movement or is being
actively monitored.
5.3 WeMo switch
The WeMo switch is an smart outlet controlled by
a physical button on the device or through the WeMo
smartphone app. WeMo switch traffic was more difficult
to distinguish using DNS queries because all resolved
addresses were from —xbcs—.amazonaws.com domains
generic to Belkin. Nevertheless, the Belkin switch traffic
was unique amongst the devices we tested for its regu-
larity. The switch only has two states, on and off, and
the network send/receive rates reflect this binarity. Fig-
ure 2D shows WeMo network behavior when the switch
is turned alternatively on and off every 2 minutes us-
ing the WeMo smartphone app. The spike in traffic
every time the switch changes state clearly reveals user
interactions with the device to an network observer.
Additional recordings performed while the switch was
turned on and off with the physical button on the de-
vice were effectively equivalent to Figure 2D. This was
initially surprising because there is no need for the de-
vice to contact the cloud in order to turn on or off in
response to a physical button press. However, we real-
ized that the state change is still communicated so the
smartphone app can display the correct “on” or “off”
icon for the device.
While the WeMo switch send receive rates reveal user
interactions with the device, they do not by themselves
indicate whether the switch is on or off. The seriousness
of this privacy vulnerability is debatable; however, it
is a case where a network observer can learn that a
human has turned power on or off to physical appliance.
If combined with techniques of learning what type of
appliance is plugged into the switch, this could have
serious privacy implications.
5.4 Amazon Echo
The Amazon Echo is the most feature-diverse of the
IoT devices we tested, and it had the correspondingly
most complex network traffic profile. DNS queries from
the Echo requested domains from amazon.com and spo-
tify.com (for third-party service integration). This makes
it difficult to assign all IP streams from the Echo to the
correct device, but this turns out to be unnecessary for
observing user interactions with the device. We tested
the Echo by asking a a series of 3 questions (”what is
the weather?” “what time is it?” and “what is the dis-
tance to Paris?”) repeated 3 times, one question every
2 minutes. Figure 2E shows the send/receive rates of
SSL traffic between the Echo and a single amazon.com
IP address during the experiment. Although the Echo
sent and received other TCP traffic to different domains
during this time, only the shown SSL traffic was no-
ticeably correlated with the user interactions. As long
as a network-level attacker can identify that particular
IP stream as originating from an Echo, the SSL traffic
spikes clearly indicate when user interactions occurred.
To some, this may not seem to be a privacy vulner-
ability because the contents of the questions are en-
crypted. However, simply learning the times of day
when customers interact with a particular device could
have unwanted advertising implications.
6. DISCUSSION
We were surprised by how easy it would be for a pas-
sive network observer to infer user behavior from en-
crypted smart home traffic. ISPs already collect enough
traffic rate information to perform the analysis we de-
scribed. Because IoT devices encode the physical world
in network traffic, this presents a novel privacy threat to
consumers. Regulatory agencies should keep this new
context in mind when making rules governing ISP data
collection and usage.
Future research should make the distinction between
IoT devices that sense and encode the physical world,
versus devices that are essentially wrappers around tra-
ditional web browsers. For instance, when a user asks
questions to the Amazon Echo, the Echo is just acting
as an audio interface to a web search engine. While in-
ferring this use of the Echo from traffic is interesting in
its own right, more privacy sensitive behaviors could be
learned from more specialized classes of devices. This is
especially true if those devices are related to healthcare
or physical security.
The user interactions we analyzed in our case stud-
ies are directly related to the limited purpose of the
device. For example, we concluded that traffic from a
sleep monitor correlates to when a user sleeps. Fur-
ther research could allow an adversary to infer higher
order behaviors, such as whether the user has a sleep-
ing disorder. This would require larger curated datasets
with controlled experiments representing a wider range
of user behaviors. Machine learning and advanced sta-
tistical techniques could also play an important part in
inferring higher order behaviors. More complex behav-
iors could also be inferred through the combination of
traffic from multiple devices.
We would like to reiterate that all of the analyses we
performed required only send/receive rates of encrypted
traffic to successfully identify user behavior. No deep
packet inspection is necessary. A systematic solution for
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Figure 2: Network traffic send/receive rates
of selected IP streams from 4 commercially-
available IoT devices during controlled experi-
ments. Clearly visible increases in send/receive
rates directly correspond with user interactions.
preserving consumer privacy would therefore require ob-
fuscating or shaping all smart home traffic to mask vari-
ations that encode real world behavior. Incorporating
VPN tunneling or another method of masking packet
headers would also make device identification more dif-
ficult. Ideally a solution would not negatively impact
IoT device performance, should respect data limits, and
would not require modification of proprietary device
software. Designing and implementing such a solution
is a primary goal of our ongoing research.
7. CONCLUSION
IoT devices for smart homes are becoming increas-
ingly pervasive; however, the privacy concerns of owning
many Internet connected devices with always-on envi-
ronmental sensors remain insufficiently addressed.
We analyzed four commercially-available smart home
devices and found that network traffic rates of all de-
vices revealed user activities, making it apparent that
encryption alone does not provide adequate privacy pro-
tection for smart homes. Given the generality of our
traffic analysis strategy and the limited-purpose nature
of most IoT devices, we would not be surprised if many
other currently available smart home devices suffer sim-
ilar privacy vulnerabilities.
We hope that consumers will become better aware of
these privacy vulnerabilities and that tools will be de-
veloped to protect smart homes from passive network
observers. We are working toward a user-friendly so-
lution for smart home owners that will prevent traffic
rates and other metadata from revealing offline user ac-
tivities. While we hope that a technological solution
will be practical and sufficient, improved regulation of
ISPs and other passive network observers may also be
necessary to offset the unique privacy challenges posed
by IoT devices.
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